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• FPGA hardware accelerators offer good
performance, high energy efficiency, fast
prototyping, and capability of
reconfiguration.
• To achieve short time-to-market, the
mapping of pre-trained CNN on hardware
accelerators is often outsourced to untrusted
third parties.
• Due to their untrusted nature hardware
intrinsic security can be compromised via
malicious hardware insertions, which are
very difficult to detect, especially if the IP is
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The SoWaF attack achieves misclassification when
triggered by shuffling the weight matrices of convolution
layers to propagate wrong feature maps. This attack is
carried out without changes in the model parameters. Our
results for two CNN architectures show that in all the
attack scenarios, additional latency is negligible (<0.61%),
increment in DSP, LUT, FF is also less than 2.36%. Three of
the five investigated scenarios show very minimal changes
in BRAM.
II. Methodology
• In a situation where the full CNN architecture is not
accessible to any one designer as seen in Multi-FPGA
CNN inference. The approaches in literature may not
be applicable.
• In this work we propose a framework of attack called
SoWaF (Shuffling of Weights and Feature Maps) that
leads to misclassification applicable to single and
multi-FPGA CNN inference.














Different techniques of inserting hardware attacks into
CNNs have been explored. These techniques assume:
• These attacks require a manipulation of the CNN
parameters.
• The attacker has full knowledge of the CNN
architecture.
• The trigger is dependent on the input image
• Their payload require extra computation
• The attack is designed for a single FPGA based
inference.
The attacker collects the output feature maps to setup a
trigger.
• As shown in the diagram above, during the functional
verification stage, a validation dataset can be used by
the attacker to access the respective CNN layer’s output
feature maps for all the dataset.
• By choosing an index randomly of one of the channels
of the output feature map of any chosen CNN layer as
shown above.
• The attacker can monitors the values (X or Y or Z) of the
randomly selected index to obtain a generalized range
of values (RoV)
• The selected RoV for a given CNN layer serve as the
trigger for the attack.
Overview of SoWaF (trigger and payload) methodology
flow is shown above.
• Section 1 of the methodology flow involves the offline
analysis of the output feature maps to design a stealthy
trigger.
• Section 2 shows the comparison of the additional
hardware overhead incurred by the embedded attack
circuitry with the design constraints.
• Section 3 shows the evaluation of the stealthiness and
effectiveness of the attack.
SoWaF Trigger Design: Offline Pre-processing
II. Methodology Cont’d
SoWaF Payload Design: Runtime Operation
• Upon triggering, for convolution and fully connected
layers, the payload shuffles the channels of the weight
matrix with another one as illustrated on the right hand
side of the decision block above.
• CNN layers other than convolution and fully connected
layers (such as Pooling layer, etc.) do not have weight
matrices and channels, the storage of the output feature
maps are shuffled
• This leads to miscalculation in the layer hence leading to
the layer output and consequently misclassification
• The attack is implemented on Lenet trained on MNIST
dataset and LeNet-3D for Cifar10 datasets as shown
above.
• To evaluate the SoWaF attack, we propose 5 different
scenarios, where each layer (from conv1 to conv3)is
infected with the attack.
• From the Table above, we see that DSP and BRAM
usage remains the same except for Sn3 and Sn5,
where BRAM is increased (5th column in Table I).
• For LUTs and FFs in all the scenarios, other than Sn5,
(i.e. Sn1-Sn4) have a very modest increment in usage
(up to 2.36%).
To demonstrate the randomness of SoWaF, various
random datasets are examined. In the diagram below,
from Sn1, when five sets (200 images each) of data is
provided to LeNet and LeNet-3D, the number of trigger
occurrences vary randomly between 5 to 9. Same is true
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